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REPORTING TREASURY STOCK AS AN ASSET:
LAW, LOGIC, AND ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE
Abstract; This paper traces development in the accounting literature, circa 19091933, of, dominant support for contra-equity presentation of treasury stock, and relates this overview to prominent current arguments for selective asset treatment.
Classic "logical" objection to asset analysis is found to be compelling. Contemporary challenges to prevailing doctrine in terms of "economic substance," enjoying distinguished lineage from the earlier era, are recast as attractive recording
and disclosure proposals. An auxiliary theme is the changing nature of relevant
objection of "legalism." Sources include Hatfield, Esquerré, Montgomery, Paton,
Kohler, and (of particular note) Sunley, and current analysts Allan Young and
Beatrice Melcher.

The recording of treasury stock transactions is a relatively flexible
area, aside from any applicable legal requirements. There are alternative basic methods, the "par value" and "cost" approaches, each
permitting varied treatment of pertinent "loss," in particular. In accounting terms, however, neither gain nor loss may be recognized
in reacquisition, reissuance, or retirement of stock.1
The corresponding reporting doctrine is that treasury stock is a
negative "equity" item, not an "asset." For fully half a century this
position has enjoyed overwhelming support among accounting
writers; in slightly qualified form it has since 1934 had "authoritative" professional endorsement;a and, reinforced by SEC provisions
Beyond the specific reference in note c, indebtedness is gratefully acknowledged
to the two anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments and suggestions.
An earlier version of this paper, entitled "An Historical Perspective on Asset Presentation of Treasury Stock," was presented at the 1979 Annual Meeting of the
American Accounting Association—Northeast Region.
a
The reference is to a 1934 AI(CP)A statement, still accepted as authoritative,
which allows that "it is perhaps in some circumstances permissible to show stock
of a corporation held in its own treasury as an asset, if adequately disclosed"
(emphasis added). Without qualification, the Committee on Accounting Procedure
in 1938 rejected both recognition of gain or loss on treasury stock transactions,
and direct adjustment of retained earnings in lieu of gain recognition. Financial
Accounting Standards Board, pp. 9 (citation), 10 (Accounting Research Bulletin 43,
Chapter 1, Sections A, paragraph 4, and B).
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and (since 1954) federal income tax law, it has for nearly as long
prevailed decisively in practice. 2 During the years 1974-78 only 1.9%
of companies surveyed by Accounting Trends and Techniques
which held their own stock (as did 72.1% of all firms covered)
carried such holdings as assets, or at least noncurrent ones.3
Within the past generation, however, treasury stock activity has
changed markedly in nature and increased immensely in volume. In
this context it has been argued that "economic substance," as
opposed to "legal form," can sometimes be expressed only through
asset treatment. One prominent analyst favors such presentation
whenever reissuance of stock is clearly "intended" at the time of
acquisition, while another one is more restrictive.
These challenges to accounting orthodoxy invite review of emergence over the first third of this century of the prevailing consensus
among accounting writers. Besides development of a consensus
position, two points warrant particular notice: original "legalistic"
argument for uniform asset presentation of treasury stock; and
assertion or anticipation by early authorities of a leading intermediate position taken today. Principal sources include Hatfield,
Esquerré, Montgomery, Paton, and Kohler. The less celebrated
author William T. Sunley, however, most incisively stated the case
against asset presentation.
Confining attention to treasury "common" stock, his argument is
found to express a compelling "logical" point which presupposes
no distinctive economic context, beyond incorporation itself, and
hence poses no obstacle to economic "realism." Even so, useful
contributions are credited to current selective asset advocates
Allan Young, a finance professor, and Beatrice Melcher, a research
associate of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA), by recasting their respective positions as specific recording
and disclosure proposals.
Establishment of Treasury Stock Orthodoxy, Circa 1909-1933
Early in this century treasury stock was normally carried as an
asset, and as late as 1932 nearly one-half of relevant companies
listed by the New York Stock Exchange followed this practice.4 By
then, there was strong consensus in the accounting literature that
asset presentation is unsound in principle. A sophisticated minority
viewpoint called for such treatment in certain instances.
Following identification of the two basic sources of reacquisition,
and relevant objectives, emergence of the consensus position is
documented, and argument for selective asset treatment is traced
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back to 1909. Finally, a concise summation from 1933 invites clarification of the prevailing analysis relative to the "entity" theory of
financial reporting.
Sources of Reacquisition, and Relevant Objectives
The basic sources of stock reacquisition, discussed in terms of
pertinent objectives of the earlier period, are (1) donation by shareholders, and (2) purchase therefrom. Forfeiture sale upon subscriber
default, a potential third source at the time given (contrary to
present practice) prior stock certificate issuance,5 is disregarded due
to relative unimportance.
Donation
Donation, a particularly prominent source of share reacquisition
in the earlier era, may serve either of two main purposes: (a) elimination of a deficit, or (b) generation of working capital.
Elimination of a Deficit
Capital stock may be donated for purposes of eliminating a
deficit, as a condition of dividend payment. Such donation would
today require formal retirement of the stock, as a basis for recording "additional paid-in capital" against which the deficit could be
written off.6 Early practice, however, sanctioned immediate recognition of "donated capital," at the par value of the shares.7 The stock
could then be held in the treasury for other purposes, including the
raising of working capital.
Generation of Working Capital
The objective of raising working capital is uniquely significant
and controversial, historically. Focus is placed upon donation subsequent to incorporation through exchange of stock wholly or principally for nonmonetary assets, such as patents, plant facilities, or
mineral properties. These assets would be stated at the par value
of the stock, rendering it "fully paid." Shareholders would then on
a pro rata basis donate shares to the firm, possibly representing up
to one-half their holdings.
The stock could then be reissued for cash at less than par, without imposing a contingent liability (to creditors) upon shareholders.
A major obstacle to attraction of investment by an untested enterprise would thus be removed.
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Early writers sometimes noted that inability to attract working
capital at par value would not in itself imply overvaluation of initial
assets. Original owners legitimately having strong faith in a new
company might recognize need by other potential investors for
special inducements.8
Nonetheless, the writers did not doubt prevalence of the "treasury
stock subterfuge," by which the nonmonetary properties were
clearly overvalued to avert contingent liability on sale of stock at a
discount. Relevant court protection for creditors was often at best
problematic.9 Concern about this abuse may well have encouraged
ready endorsement of contra-equity treatment of treasury stock,
as well as advent of no-par (and low-par-value) stock.
Purchase
A prominent textbook of 1931b listed eight objectives of common
stock "repurchase" (to use later terminology):
1. Relieving a retiring stockholder of his interest in a close corporation
2. Replacing a retiring stockholder in such a firm
3. Accommodating a stockholder
4. Eliminating a "dissident" stockholder
5. Securing shares for distribution to employees
6. Investing surplus funds
7. Taking advantage of an expected rise in market value
8. Simply reducing outstanding stock.10
This listing seems particularly relevant to "close" corporations.
Items 1 and 2 are defined in terms of such companies, while numbers 3 and 4 are apt to be particularly asociated with them. Objectives 5 and 7 relate wholly or primarily to "public" firms.
More direct evidence that reacquisition through purchase was
not prevalent among publicly held corporations in the earlier era
is provided by a contemporary study identifying 1932 as a year
of unusually heavy treasury activity. In that year twenty-six companies listed on the New York Exchange repurchased shares (averb
Through national balloting among both academic and practicing accountants,
Sunley and Pinkerton's text was nominated for Beta Alpha Psi's "Most Notable
Contribution to the Accounting Literature Award" for the twelve months ended
May 1, 1931. Also nominated, among twenty-five books listed, were works by
Roy Kester; A. H. Church, a noted cost accounting writer; historian Wilmer Green;
and W. B. Castenholz, like Sunley a prominent accounting author, practitioner, and
correspondence educator. The award ultimately went to Castenholz's book. Sheldahl, pp. 480-495.
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aging approximately five percent of total stock outstanding), compared with eight in 1931 and six in 1933. The study concluded that
"investment," in a sense embracing items 6 and 7 together, was
the primary motive of such activity.11
These references tend to support a critic's assertion that when
the orthodox reporting doctrine arose reacquisition was generally
insignificant to ongoing corporate financial planning.12 Centrality
of "defensive" considerations in an era of severe depression must,
however, be acknowledged.
"Legalistic"

Arguments for Asset Treatment

Given the widespread early practice of carrying debit and credit
items, as such, respectively on the asset and equity sides of the
balance sheet,13 it is not surprising that treasury stock initially
was widely reported as an asset. Prominent authorities supported
such practice on two narrowly "legalistic" grounds, the second
of which calls to mind the virtual prohibition of treasury holdings
in Great Britain.
Establishment of Monetary Value
Harry C. Bentley, in 1911, and Robert H. Montgomery, in 1912 and
1916, advocated asset presentation because stock repurchase, like
purchase in general, establishes a "monetary value." Consideration
rendered reflects value acquired.14 Presumably interpreting donation through analogy, these authors viewed treasury stock as a
"commodity, to be held or sold according to the wishes of management." 15
While in essence it merely notes that reacquisition is normally a
market transaction involving outflow of funds, this argument is
important historically as the original rationale for recording
treasury stock at cost.
Maintenance of Legal Capital, and a
Related Reference to British Law
Writing in 1914, Paul-Joseph Esquerré supported asset treatment
because under governing, laws reacquisition generally did not reduce "legal capital." 16 Basically, the par or stated value of reacquired stock was assumed to represent continuing capitalization
in accounting terms. A like position perhaps lay behind the statement of a 1922 corporate law text that "with some logical correctness" reacquired "full-paid stock" would be reported as an asset.17
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This legalistic argument conflicts with the first one, by implying
that treasury stock should be recorded at par or stated value (as
holdings thereafter reported as assets often were at the time18).
It is no more persuasive logically, in its invitation to extreme relativism through statutory variation. However, Esquerré's position
draws attention to a most basic objective of legal regulation in the
area, and, in turn, traditional prohibition of treasury stock in
Britain.c
State laws by which reacquisition without retirement leaves legal
capital intact serve to protect creditors, and shareholders themselves, from excessive distribution of funds. Confining repurchase
to the amount of retained earnings, or retained earnings and "additional paid-in capital," they effect a trade-off between such action
and dividend payout. Related protection is provided by statutory
regulation of legitimate reacquisition purposes and, in individual
cases, bond covenant restrictions in the area.19
In British law concern for possible (1) harm to creditors, (2)
manipulation of stock prices by companies "trafficking" in their
own shares, and (3) abuse of any formal voting rights which might
be recognized led very early to outright prohibition of treasury
stock.20 The principle that a company cannot be its own shareholder was established in 1887, in the case Trevor v. Whitworth,
and later made statutory. It was relaxed negligibly by the Companies Act of 1948, providing in specified cases for court-ordered
share reacquisition from "oppressed" stockholders (in a clause
repealed in 1980), and also forfeiture by defaulting subscribers
without court involvement; and otherwise stipulating strict conditions for reduction in capital under court supervision.21
British corporate law also forbids a company to finance acquisition of its shares by another party, in any measure, or, if controlled by another company, to acquire an interest in that firm. The
very restrictive overall policy is compromised somewhat, however,
by provision for acquisition of a company's stock, or that of its
parent, by trustees or other "nominees." 22 Also, a subsidiary having
obtained an interest in another corporation before takeover by that
firm may apparently retain it, although one authoritative source
recommends divestiture or arrangement for stock cancellation.23
British accounting treatments have not been investigated in the
present research. However, a subsidiary holding shares in its
c
Gratitude is expressed to the anonymous reviewer who suggested making
reference at this point to British law. It may be noted further that the European
Economic Community has adopted stringent regulations concerning share reacquisition within member countries. Schmitthoff, vol. 3, secs. L-633—L-639.
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parent company would presumably report them as an asset, although voting rights might be highly problematic. More pertinently,
within the (hostile) British legal environment it would be particularly meaningful in consolidated statements to report such holdings
as treasury stock, analyzed as an equity deduction item. This
"treasury stock method" enjoys considerable support in the United
States.24
Fleeting Influence of Legalism
The influence of early legalistic cases for asset presentation was
short-lived. Montgomery himself would soon advocate selective
asset presentation, while more generally support for uniform contraequity treatment was becoming well entrenched.
In part such developments simply reflected an expanding sophistication in accounting thought, including assertion for accounting of greater autonomy from the legal realm. Additionally, legalistic
arguments could only seem particularly unpersuasive in the light of
the troublesome area of donation. While one writer suggested that
donated stock might be listed at zero valuation, at the foot of the
asset section,25 it was commonly assumed that donation had immediate accounting effect. Under asset treatment, the result could
only be to increase total asset valuation over a level perhaps already
highly inflated. Reissuance at a discount would then paradoxically
decrease total valuation.
Legalistic advocacy of asset treatment for treasury stock was
promptly eclipsed by the basic argument for contra-equity presentation, ironically itself considered legalistic by present critics of
conventional analysis.
The Classic Logical Case Against Asset
Presentation, and Supporting Arguments
The classic logical case against asset presentation, that the idea
of "self-ownership" by a corporation has no content, was advanced
by William T. Sunley in 1915. Several of his contemporaries added
useful supporting points.
Sunley's Classic Statement
Sunley asserted simply that the "corporate" shareholder could
in no meaningful sense possess three capacities or rights fundamental to corporate ownership. They are participation in (a) election
of the board of directors, (b) distribution of periodic dividends, and
(c) distribution of assets in liquidation. Formal participation in these
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areas by the company itself would in substance be proportionate
assignment to holders of outstanding stock of additional votes,
dividends, or assets.26
This point is self-evident relative to liquidating distribution.
Further, while sometimes legally permitted in the earlier era, through
transfer from retained earnings to dividend income,27 formal participation in dividends clearly would have no content. Moreover, the
argument is equally strong as to voting rights. Proportionate representation of either operating management or the sitting corporate
directorate would contradict their basic rationale, while any other
approach would be fully as arbitrary as designation of recipients of
the "corporate" share upon liquidation.
Sunley could easily have extended his argument to the "preemptive right," a characteristic feature of ownership in his time.
A corporation could not meaningfully exercise "rights" relative to
itself. Any pretense in that regard could only imply their proportional
increase for holders of stock still outstanding, or exclusion from
issuance of the relevant percentage of shares.
Almost the only ownership entitlement available to the "corporate" shareholders is transfer of reacquired shares to other parties
for value, and even it involves special legal restriction.28
Supporting References
It is useful to note selected supporting points, or statements,
made in the earlier period for contra-equity analysis of treasury
stock. In 1909 Henry Rand Hatfield stated that "In a certain sense
any return of capital stock to the issuing company may be considered as a virtual cancellation of that amount of the previously
issued stock," 29 without yet (as noted below) accepting the apparent
reporting implications of this interpretation. Some years later, however, in essentially a revised edition of the 1909 text, Hatfield would
endorse uniform contra-equity treatment.30
Also writing before Sunley, Arthur Lowes Dickinson stated that
capital stock "represents the manner in which its property and
assets are distributed among those who constitute the corporation,"
and continued as follows:
If one of those owners disposes of his shares to the corporation, he withdraws therefrom, taking with him what he
Considers his fair proportion of the asset value, and leaving
the rest to be divided among the remaining owners.31
William A. Paton, just beginning his career, likewise insisted upon
contra-equity treatment. Responding to the objection that "fully
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paid" treasury stock would tend to be more marketable than unissued shares, he remarked that this difference no more warranted
asset presentation than would the value to a bank of its right to
issue currency justify recognition of a pertinent asset. He further
advanced two "reductio ad absurdum" arguments effective against
undiscriminating recognition of treasury stock as an asset: first,
that formal retirement of shares could not intelligibly be interpreted
as asset destruction; and second, that asset treatment implies that
a firm could reacquire virtually all its stock outstanding without
contracting its capital base.32
Other prominent proponents of contra-equity analysis included
Hastings Lyon, Roy Kester, and R. J. Bennett and Paul Pinkerton
(although, as noted presently, Pinkerton took another position in a
subsequent collaboration).33
Early Argument for "Selective" Asset Presentation
In 1909 Hatfield introduced argument for "selective" asset presentation, despite the reference just made to his early thought, by
suggesting that management purposes should govern reporting of
reacquired stock:
If it [reacquisition] is done with the intention of reducing
the Capital Stock, certainly the stock . . . should be
deducted from the amount of the outstanding stock . . . .
But if the stock is not acquired with the intent of reducing
the capitalization, and is not canceled, accounting practice
in this country certainly justifies and, indeed, requires
that it be shown among the assets.34
Only stock reacquired with retirement intent would on this approach be reported as a deduction item. Like his early successors
in the tradition he initiated, Hatfield expressed only implicitly the
basic premise of his position: that in certain cases reacquisition
can reduce capital only in form, not substance.
Montgomery refined the analysis in the 1920s, in the third (1921)
and fourth (1927) editions of the auditing text in which he had
earlier advanced his form of legalism.35 His new position was stated
most clearly, however, in a 1923 abridgement prepared with the aid
of one of his partners.
Montgomery asserted that stock "purchased for resale" (or,
clearly other reissuance) should be reported as an asset at cost,d
d|n his fourth edition Montgomery expressly favored reduction to "market" given
a price decline regarded as permanent. Montgomery, 1927, p. 245.
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while shares reacquired "without specific intention to resell" should
be presented "as a deduction from the capital stock issued," at
par.36 Due to pertinent abuse, however, he called for presentation
of donated shares as equity deduction items, at par, balanced by
reduction of relevant nonmonetary asset items.37
Montgomery's approach differs from Hatfield's 1909 position primarily in analyzing reacquisition without clear intention in either
direction, retirement or reissuance, as a decrease in capital. A
secondary difference is that Hatfield had made no special provision
for donation, perhaps because conspicuous abuse in the area did
not yet exist.
Montgomery's position on repurchase (at least) drew support in
1931 from a most unlikely source: Sunley himself, in collaboration
with Pinkerton, another early advocate of contra-equity analysis.e
Referring to their listing of basic reacquisition objectives, Sunley
and Pinkerton observed that, while only speculation and employee
distribution entail reissuance intent, only reduction in capital excludes it. Varied contextual features, including evidence of estabished company policy, might indicate such intent. Even reacquisition
to accommodate a stockholder or eliminate a dissident would warrant asset treatment if a buyer were secured in advance.38
While Hatfield wrote in 1927 that "accounting practice occasionally" followed Montgomery's approach to selective asset treatment,39 no explicit commentary on it has been found. The closest
implicit reply was Paton's negative reference to "marketability" of
treasury shares as a basis for asset analysis.
The most direct rebuttal, however, is that a purpose requiring
ultimate maintenance of capital might be sought through a strategy
involving temporary contraction. Another potentially telling objection is that the position is unworkable, because "intention" may
manipulatively be disguised. These points are of particular interest
in that Montgomery's position has of late been revived, as discussed
below.
Kohler's Summation: Treasury Stock
Orthodoxy and the Entity Theory
With no more than minor overstatement, Eric Kohler in 1933
characterized accounting texts of the time as "well-nigh unanimous"
e
Sunley reverted to his original position in the revised edition of his text, involving a different coauthor. Sunley and Carter, pp. 90-91.
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in supporting contra-equity analysis of treasury stock. He regarded
this position as "unassailable," if the corporation were genuinely
a "separate organism." 40
This reference relates the consensus viewpoint to the "entity"
theory of the corporation. Its essence is simply that a corporation
cannot intelligibly be regarded as a partial owner of itself. On a
"proprietorship" outlook, by comparison, the full shareholder group
might be viewed as collective owner of treasury holdings, hardly a
clearer interpretation.
Kohler's interpretation may prompt a contemporary objection of
"legalism" against treasury stock orthodoxy, but only misguidedly.
First, any meaningful analysis must presuppose the basic concepts
of property ownership and corporate structure.
Second, it is not assumed that corporations are "real" entities,
on the order of observable physical objects. Effort is invited to
"pierce the corporate veil," by way of reconstructing Sunley's 1915
argument in terms of one or more standard logical fallacies, such
as circularity or infinite regression. The following argument, formulated as if treasury stock were an asset, might serve as a first
approximation:
1. Ownership of common stock constitutes "indirect" partial
ownership of an evolving body of financial resources, constrained in their management by an evolving body of financial
obligations
2. Ownership of common stock in a company whose resources
include treasury common stock constitutes "indirect" partial
ownership of that item itself, among the other resources
3. The treasury stock itself represents "indirect"' partial ownership of the body of resources within which it is included
4. Hence, ownership of common stock in a company whose resources include treasury common stock constitutes "indirect"
partial ownership of that item (among the other holdings),
which in turn constitutes "indirect" partial ownership of that
item (among other holdings), . . . , and so on, ad infinitum.
While adequate clarification of "indirect" ownership would be
a challenging task, it should be possible to restate the case against
asset presentation in line with analysis of the corporation as a "legal
fiction." Before submitting final judgment, however, current argument for selective asset treatment must be considered.
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Contemporary Heterodoxy, in Two Formulations
While it has prevailed decisively at the levels of both theory and
practice, uniform contra-equity analysis has recently been challenged by Allan Young and Beatrice Melcher. They have in turn
revived Montgomery's position, and taken a less subjective approach to selective asset treatment, representing only modest advance in sophistication.
The new "heterodoxy" is very noteworthy, however, in view
of qualitative and quantitative changes having greatly enhanced
significance of treasury stock activity. In the early era stock repurchase was relatively rare, and usually required contra-equity
presentation in any case. Today, in significant quantities, it is commonplace, and purposes viewed by current critics as requiring asset
treatment have gained prominence.
Changes in Scope and Objectives
of Treasury Stock Activity
Share reacquisition, by purchase, has expanded remarkably
during the past generation. From 1954 to 1969 annual repurchase
by companies listed on the New York Exchange increased from 5.8
million to 64.0 million shares, representing respectively 1.02%f and
2.02% of total shares traded. After a brief period of decline it rose
abruptly to 143.8 million shares, or 3.32% of overall trading, in 1973.
In that "bear-market" year 219 companies, approximately oneseventh of the listed corporations, reacquired at least one hundred
thousand common shares.41
A survey conducted among the chief financial executives of those
companies identified the following objectives, in the order listed, as
having been the most prevalent bases for reacquisition:
1. Obtaining shares for executive stock options, other incentive
compensation programs, and employee stock purchase plans
2. Obtaining shares for corporate acquisition (business combination) programs
3. Improving earnings per shareg
4. Obtaining shares for conversions of bonds or preferred stock
5. Temporarily investing surplus cash
f
This first figure (only) is biased upward, by exclusion from the base of shares
traded prior to stock dividends or stock splits, although the reduction is offset in
part by inclusion of preferred shares. "New York Stock Exchange Stocks," p. 28.
g
The SEC in 1979 adopted a requirement by which registrants must disclose
impact of stock repurchase upon earnings per share. Beresford and Neary, p. 6.
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6. Supporting the market price of common stock
7. Increasing the debt/equity ratio.42
This listing is not fully comparable to the one cited for the earlier
period, which was nonranked in form, basically impressionistic, and
scarcely confined to public corporations. Even so, the lists imply
that reacquisition was generally much less significant to overall
financial planning in the earlier period. Only two of the eight early
objectives appear in the current list, namely, obtaining shares for
distribution to employees, and investing surplus funds.h Further, the
former one is immensely more important in the present day.
Against this background, Young and Melcher have called for reexamination of the traditional reporting doctrine.
Young's Revival of Montgomery's

Analysis

Young takes the position represented by Montgomery in the
1920s, omitting, as had Sunley and Pinkerton, reference to donation.
Characterizing assets as "uses of funds which still retain a service
potential to the firm," 43 he would so present all shares repurchased
with clear "intention" of reissuance, for any recognizable management purpose.44 Formal commitment to reissuance is considered unnecessary. Valuation would be at cost or the lower of cost or market,
depending upon whether classification were "noncurrent" or (inadmissibly for Montgomery) "current." 45
In support of this position, three contexts are cited in which management purposes are commonly accepted as central to accounting analysis: distinction between current and noncurrent assets;
operating and financial leases; and stock dividends and stock
splits. 46 In the latter two instances the alternative would be strict
control by legal form.
Terminologically, it would be preferable to speak of "expectation"
of reissuance as the condition for asset treatment, since initiative
may rest with parties other than management, as in conversion of
other securities to common stock. Substantively, Young's criterion
invites the objection of undue subjectivity, and encouragement
thereby of accounting manipulation by management.
The latter objection arises from the direct implication, largely
ignored by Young, that reissuance may yield "gain" or "loss." While
speculative purposes may give pause in this regard, linkage of reh
Two of the other objectives cited in the prior listing, numbers 6 and 8, were
cited by the contemporary financial executives surveyed, but by fewer than 10 of
the 113 respondents in each case. Walsh, p. 6.
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acquisition with the earnings process seems generally implausible.
For example, the standard criticism of accounting for conversion
of bonds at market price of either security is provision of such
treatment for gain or loss.47 Such objection can hardly be dismissed
out of hand.
There is risk of severe paradox in Young's position, in any case,
For example, if "economic substance" is to govern accounting
treatment of reacquired stock, should not unissued shares be carried
as an asset if they are to be placed on the market in lieu of reissuance of treasury holdings? Since "gain" on reissuance was taxable
for two decades, 1934-54,48 this case historically is realistic.
Melcher's Case for Narrower Asset Treatment
Melcher's relatively complex approach yields much narrower
advocacy of asset presentation. She would require both that (1)
reacquisition serve on explicit requirement that the company acquire its own shares, and (2) the specified purpose be of an "operating" nature rather than a "financing" one.49 More concisely,
treasury stock should be reported as an asset if it is acquired relative to an express commitment, to serve particular operating objectives. Donated stock would almost as such fail the test.
"Operating" objectives are illustrated mainly in terms of compensation plans, notably stock option and purchase programs,
profit-sharing and bonus provisions, and deferred compensation
contracts. Treasury shares may also be used for pension plan costs,
sales commissions, and charitable donations.50
Stock reacquisition for "financing" purposes directly concerns
equity interests. Objectives include (a) investment of excess funds,
(b) revision in financing sources, (c) anticipation of conversions and
exercise of warrants, (d) distribution of stock dividends, and (e)
implementation of business combinations. Melcher disallows asset
treatment in such cases on the premise that change in ownership
interests alone cannot yield gain or loss.51
Melcher advocates asset treatment, and attendant recognition of
gain or loss (as applicable), for reacquisitions "specifically required
for a designated operating purpose," 52 because "distributing stock
to satisfy liabilities does not change the underlying nature and purpose of incurring costs." 53 Since only action by the board of directors is specifically cited, it is perhaps assumed that contractual
commitment to stock reacquisition would ordinarily require prior
board approval.
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Such limitation of asset treatment is no doubt intended to forestall income manipulation through treasury stock activity. Shares acquired prior to origination of a need for treasury shares would not
qualify, nor would stock acquired with the idea of discretionary reissuance in fulfillment of a given obligation, in preference either to
issuance of new shares, or to distribution of cash or marketable
securities.54
Unlike Young's, this position has some affinity with official authoritative tradition. The cryptic 1934 AI(CP)A statement on treasury
stock cited in note (a) contemplated that asset analysis might on
occasion be "permissible," without citing instances. The SEC, however, has approved asset reporting of shares reacquired expressly
for prompt use in employee bonus or stock purchase plans, for
example,55 and otherwise orthodox analysts have tentatively accepted such treatment.i Melcher has gone further, endorsing mandatory asset presentation in these cases.
Overall, the distinction between two classes of objectives seems
pertinent if treasury stock activity indeed relates to the earnings
process. Further, the condition that reissuance be required would
clearly support objectivity. At the same time, it seems a bit paradoxical to recognize gain or loss on transactions relating to compensation plans, but not ones involving reissuance of shares acquired as an "investment."
Broader appraisal of the views of Young and Melcher than
has as yet been made awaits final evaluation of the basic case
against asset treatment.
Reaffirmation of Orthodoxy, Accommodating
Dissident Analyses
By way of conclusion, the classic argument against asset presentation of treasury stock is reaffirmed, while means are identified for
deriving substantial contributions nonetheless from both Young
and Melcher.
Unsuccessful Efforts to Refute
Sunley's Classic Argument
Sunley's contention that a corporation cannot be an owner of
itself seems generally compelling, on its own terms. Proponents of
asset treatment may still submit, however, that it mainly addresses
i
Finney and Miller, pp. 122-123. The authors cited themselves take a strictly
orthodox reporting position, however.
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features unimportant to modern share ownership, or that it subordinates basic objectives of financial reporting to empty logical
abstractions. Failure of each rebuttal effort leaves such analysts
only the bleak option of "heroic denial" that their positions do imply
self-ownership.
Analytical Approach: Alleged Conceptual

Distortion

The basic "analytical" response to Sunley's argument would be
that the primary features of modern stock ownership are storage of
value and eligibility for periodic dividends, and that they are respectively ignored and approached misleadingly by the argument.
Treasury stock could be viewed as conferring a counterpart to
participation in cash or property dividends, through "saving"
dividend payout. The other features considered by the classic
argument, as discussed above, might be dismissed as follows:
1. Voting privileges are generally a mere formality
2. Emphasis upon participation in liquidating dividends conflicts
with the "going concern" premise of accounting
3. As indicated by declining incidence, 56 preemptive rights are
relatively insignificant in the present day.
Allusion to storage of value recalls Paton's response to assertion of asset status based on "marketability" of treasury shares,
at a time in which they often were more attractive to investors than
newly authorized stock. The references made to other features are
equally misleading. Delay in issuance of new shares likewise
"saves" dividend distributions. Further, voting is not a formality
within close corporations, although they may for example reacquire
shares with reissuance intent. Moreover, assesment of liquidation
prospects may properly affect decisions on retention or acquisition of stock, and their residual equity interest is the prime concern of a company's "final" shareholders. Finally, while the preemptive right has declined in overall importance, it is hardly an
irrelevant or incidental feature of common stock, where it exists.
Methodological Approach: Alleged

"Formalism"

"Methodologically," a selective asset advocate may insist that
a purely conceptual argument making no reference to management
objectives, economic implications, or other behavioral bearings
must not control accounting treatments. This objection of
"formalism" is a contemporary allegation of accounting legalism.
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While it is an accounting truism that ultimately substance must
prevail over form, the classic argument for contra-equity analysis
cannot be dismissed on this basis. Two relevant points have already
been made: that substantive likenesses between treasury stock and
unissued shares could in no event justify asset recognition in the
latter case; and that management purposes not involving reduction
in capital might be approached through temporary contraction.
The decisive rebuttal, however, is that if there are relevant material differences between different contexts of share reacquisition,
it should be possible to represent them in accounting/reporting
terms without inviting logical paradox. The remaining task is to
illustrate this point relative to the positions of Young and Melcher,
having concluded that the orthodox doctrine on treasury stock reporting is correct.
Accommodation

of the Heterodox

Positions

Three possible approaches remain for giving accounting recognition to different contexts of stock reacquisition: (1) differential
recording of transactions; (2) supplemental disclosure; and (3) a
combination of courses 1 and 2. In an effort to salvage significant
contributions from both critics of orthodox accounting treatment,
the third alternative is adopted. Young's position is recast as a
"recording" doctrine, while Melcher's variation is expressed at the
"disclosure" level.
Basic Treasury Stock Recording Methods:
A Complementary Interpretation
Practice has followed theory relative to presentation of treasury
stock. However, accounting writers have predominantly favored the
"par value" approach to recording of relevant transactions, while
practice has generally favored the "cost" method. The two alternatives may be reconciled by recognizing them as suited to different
contexts of stock reacquisition.
Historical Divergence Between Theory and Practice
In the earlier period a strong consensus developed in favor of the
"par value" recording method, by which reacquisition is recorded
essentially as retirement of stock, and reissuance as an independent
transaction. Representative advocates of recording treasury stock
at par or stated value included Paton, Kester, Hatfield, and Harry A.
Finney.57 Apparently the "cost" method, by which treasury shares
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are recorded at cost and their reissuance is accounted for as a
follow-up transaction, was associated too closely with the discredited reporting doctrine of asset treatment to be attractive.
The par value approach was endorsed in 1957 by the American
Accounting Association Committee on Concepts and Standards,58
and may yet today enjoy more support than the cost method among
accounting writers. It was recently commended by Melcher, for
nonasset contexts, and also by two parties linking the other recording procedure to asset presentation of reacquired shares, Norlin
Rueschhoff and textbook collaborators D. E. Kieso and J. J. Weygandt.59
Even so, the cost method has dominated practice. During the
years 1974-78, 86.7% of surveyed companies which reported
treasury stock in the equity section did so at cost, of which 97.1%
treated it as a final deduction item.60 Classification by reacquisition
context is, however, unavailable.
Proposed Complementarity of the Methods
It is submitted that recognition of the two recording methods as
mutual competitors is misguided, and only forestalls effective
response to advocates of selective asset presentation. A complementary interpretation advanced by Eldon Hendriksen,61 and in a
modified form having official support as well,j is adopted instead.
Specifically, the cost method should be used whenever reacquisition occurs with clear intention or expectation of reissuance,
whether or not a formal requirement exists, and the par value
method otherwise. In the latter case, "'constructive retirement" is
assumed.
The position taken parallels Young's approach to selective asset
treatment, because the distinctive features of Melcher's analysis
seem rather arbitrary outside such a context. First, since gain or
loss would not be recognized in any case, the rationale for differential recording of reacquisition for "operating" and "financing"
objectives is removed. Second, the strictures as to "requirement"
of reacquisition presuppose opportunity, otherwise, for income
manipulation, whereas any subjectivity within the dualistic approach
adopted would affect presentation only of the equity accounts
themselves. Any incentive provided in this context to manipulate
j
ln paragraph 12b of Opinion
No. 6, the Accounting Principles Board recommended use of a "cost" basis "When a corporation's stock is acquired for purposes other than retirement (formal or constructive), or when ultimate disposition
has not yet been decided." In the latter regard it differs from Hendriksen's position, supported in this study. Financial Accounting Standards Board, p. 139.
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reported accounting numbers, themselves, is assumed to be minimal.
To leave matters at this point, however, would invite concern as
to undue subjectivity in reporting, relative to management purposes
themselves. A relevant requirement of disclosure should thus accompany the dualistic doctrine governing recording of treasury
stock activity.
A Proposal as to Supplemental

Disclosure

It is suggested, then, that through supplemental disclosure distinction should be drawn between shares reacquired subject to
formal "requirement" of reissuance, and other holdings recorded
at cost. Inclusion of such information would not only accommodate
Melcher's viewpoint, but also ease the burden upon the independent auditor in attesting to the equity section of the balance sheet.
While the appropriate level of detail is debatable, in the absence
of relevant empirical study of reader needs, additional information
regarding treasury stock holdings might be provided in this connection. For example, a distinction could be drawn between "current" and "noncurrent" items, based upon time frame of anticipated reissuance. Such a disclosure would capture still another
dimension of Young's position.
In summary, the area of supplemental disclosure is likely to be
highly important in developing standards for treasury stock reporting.
Concluding

Comment

The historical overview developed above has both recognized
an enduring contribution on the part of early work relative to
treasury stock reporting, and provided an invitation to contemporary
research concerning specific recording and disclosure issues arising in the area. In particular, the force of the classic logical argument against asset presentation has been reaffirmed, without general dismissal of the views of heterodox analysts, past or present.
By sorting out the principal legal, logical, and economic issues
whose interplay is involved, the study has identified treasury stock
accounting as an area more intriguing than the volume of scholarly
attention to date directed towards it might suggest.
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